The framework of algorithmic knowledge assumes that agents use algorithms to compute the facts they explicitly know. In many cases of interest, a deductive system, rather than a particular algorithm, captures the formal reasoning used by the agents to compute what they explicitly know. We introduce a logic for reasoning about both implicit and explicit knowledge with the latter defined with respect to a deductive system formalizing a logical theory for agents. The highly structured nature of deductive systems leads to very natural axiomatizations of the resulting logic when interpreted over any fixed deductive system. The decision problem for the logic, in the presence of a single agent, is NP-complete in general, no harder than propositional logic. It remains NP-complete when we fix a deductive system that is decidable in nondeterministic polynomial time. These results extend in a straightforward way to multiple agents.
Introduction
It is well known that the standard model of knowledge based on possible worlds is subject to the problem of logical omniscience, that is, the agents know all the logical consequences of their knowledge [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995, Chapter 9] . Thus, possible-world definitions of knowledge make it difficult to reason about the knowledge that agents need to explicitly compute in order to make decisions and perform actions, or to capture situations where agents want to reason about the knowledge that other agents need to explicitly compute in order to perform actions.
This observation leads to a distinction between two forms of knowledge, implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge (or resource-bounded knowledge), a distinction long recognized [Rosenschein 1985 ]. The classical AI approach known as the interpreted symbolic structures approach, where knowledge is based on information stored in data structures of the agent, can be seen as an instance of explicit knowledge. In contrast, the situated automata approach, which interprets knowledge based on information carried by the state of the machine, can be seen as an instance of implicit knowledge. Levesque [1984] makes a similar distinction between implicit belief and explicit belief.
While the possible-worlds approach is taken as the standard model for implicit knowledge, there is no standard model for explicit knowledge. A general approach appropriate for many situations * A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, AI&M 22-2004, 2004 . This work was mostly done while the author was at Cornell University.
is that of algorithmic knowledge [Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1994] . In the algorithmic knowledge framework, the explicit knowledge of an agent is given by a knowledge algorithm that the agent uses to establish whether he knows a particular fact. Algorithmic knowledge is sufficiently expressive to capture a number of approaches to resource-bounded reasoning that have appeared in the literature [Levesque 1984; Konolige 1986; Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis 1990] . 1 The generality of the algorithmic knowledge approach makes it ideal as a modeling framework. One consequence of that generality, however, is that there are no nontrivial logical properties of algorithmic knowledge proper, unless we focus on specific classes of knowledge algorithms. This consequence is important if the framework is to be used as a specification language for properties of multiagent systems, amenable to automated verification. In such a setting, we would like a class of knowledge algorithms that can capture properties of interest for the verification task at hand, while retaining enough structure to yield a tractable or analyzable framework. This structure will typically implies a number of properties of the corresponding algorithmic knowledge operator, which can be used to study properties of multiagent systems purely deductively. This general observation leads naturally to a program of studying interesting classes of knowledge algorithms.
In this paper, we study a form of algorithmic knowledge, deductive algorithmic knowledge, where the explicit knowledge of agents comes from a logical theory expressed by a deductive system made up of deduction rules, in which the agents perform their reasoning about the facts they know. Many useful forms of explicit knowledge can be formalized using deductive systems. For instance, Horn theories [Selman and Kautz 1996] , which have been used to approximate more general knowledge bases, fit into this framework. Explicit knowledge via a deductive system can be viewed as a form of algorithmic knowledge, where the knowledge algorithm used by an agent attempts to infer whether a fact is derivable from the deduction rules provided by the agent's deductive system. Among other advantages, viewing deductive algorithmic knowledge as an instance of algorithmic knowledge lets us model "feasible" explicit knowledge, by considering deductive systems whose corresponding knowledge algorithm is efficient (e.g., runs in polynomial time). The approach to modeling explicit knowledge through deductive systems is essentially that of Konolige [1986] . The basic idea, which we review in Section 2, is that a deductive system is a set of rules that describe how to infer new facts from old facts. We take the initial facts of an agent to be his observations, that is, what the agent can determine simply by examining his local state.
We describe in Section 3 a logic for reasoning about both implicit knowledge and deductive algorithmic knowledge, with formulas Kϕ to express implicit knowledge of ϕ, and Xϕ to express deductive algorithmic knowledge of ϕ. For simplicity, the logic we present is propositional, although there is no difficulty in extending it to a first-order setting. (Of course, the standard questions about interactions between quantification and modal operators arise in such a setting.) Why reason about two forms of knowledge? It turns out that in many situations, one wants to reason about both forms of knowledge. Intuitively, implicit knowledge is useful for specifications and describes "ideal" knowledge, while deductive algorithmic knowledge is useful to capture the knowledge that agents can actually compute and use. Consider the following example. In previous work, we showed how the framework of algorithmic knowledge could be used to reason about agents communicating through cryptographic protocols [Halpern and Pucella 2002] . Algorithmic knowledge is useful to model an adversary that has certain capabilities for decoding the messages he intercepts. There are of course restrictions on the capabilities of a reasonable adversary. For instance, the adversary may not explicitly know that he has a given message if that message is encrypted using a key that the adversary does not know. To capture these restrictions, Dolev and Yao [1983] gave a now-standard description of capabilities of adversaries. Roughly speaking, a Dolev-Yao adversary can decompose messages, or decipher them if he knows the right keys, but cannot otherwise "crack" encrypted messages. The adversary can also construct new messages by concatenating known messages, or encrypting them with a known encryption key. It is natural to formalize a Dolev-Yao adversary using a deductive system that describes what messages the adversary possesses based on the messages he has intercepted, and what messages the adversary can construct. This lets us describe properties such as "the adversary can compute (i.e., explicitly knows) the secret exchanged during the protocol run". To capture the fact that some other agent in the system knows that a secret exchanged during the protocol run in fact remains a secret from the adversary, we can use implicit knowledge, as in "agent A knows (i.e., implicitly knows) that the adversary cannot compute (i.e., explicitly knows) the secret exchanged during the protocol run". In this sense, specifications can refer to both kinds of knowledge. (The specification above requires an extension of the logic to handle multiple agents; see Section 6.)
A key operator in the logic is the operator Ob that identifies the observations made at a state. In a precise sense, this operator is the connection between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge: deductive algorithmic knowledge uses observations as the initial facts from which further facts explicitly known are derived, while implicit knowledge uses observations to distinguish states, in that two states are indistinguishable exactly when the agent has the same observations in both states. Thus, we can study the interaction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and go beyond previous work that only attempts to model explicit knowledge [Konolige 1986; Giunchiglia, Serafini, Giunchiglia, and Frixione 1993] . Our work shows one way to combine a standard possibleworlds account of implicit knowledge with a deductive system representing the explicit knowledge of agents, and to reason about both simultaneously.
A principal goal of this paper is to study the technical properties of the resulting logic, such as axiomatizations and complexity of decision problems, and see how they relate to properties of the deductive systems. In Section 4, we study axiomatizations for reasoning about specific deductive systems. Not surprisingly, if we do not make any assumption on the deductive system, there are very few properties captured by the axiomatization, which is essentially a slight extension of well-known axiomatizations for implicit knowledge. However, if we restrict our attention to models where the agent uses a specific deductive system, then the properties of X depend on that deductive system. Intuitively, we should be able to read off the properties of X from the deduction rules. We formalize this intuition by showing that we can derive sound and complete axiomatizations for our logic with respect to models equipped with a specific deductive system, where the axiomatization is derived mechanically from the rules of the deductive system.
In Section 5, we address the complexity of the decision problem for the logic in the presence of a single agent, that is, the complexity of deciding if a formula of the logic is satisfiable with respect to a class of models. Without any assumption on the deductive systems, deciding satisfiability is NP-complete; this is not surprising, since the logic in that context is essentially just a logic of implicit knowledge, known to be NP-complete [Ladner 1977 ] when there is a single agent. If we fix a specific deductive system, then deciding satisfiability with respect to the class of models using that deductive system is NP-hard, and it is possible to show NP-completeness when the deductive system is itself decidable in nondeterministic polynomial time and the models considered have a small number of observations at each state.
In Section 6, we consider a natural extension of our framework to reason about multiple agents. This is needed to study the Dolev-Yao example given above in its full generality, or any interesting example from the multiagent systems literature. The extension is straightforward, and many of the results generalize in the obvious way, justifying our decision to focus on the single agent model for the bulk of the paper. For instance, the complexity of the decision problem when there are multiple agents becomes PSPACE-complete, again following from logics of implicit knowledge themselves having PSPACE-complete decision problems [Halpern and Moses 1992] in the presence of multiple agents. The proofs of our technical results are deferred to the appendices.
Deductive Systems
We start by defining the framework in which we capture the logical theories of the agents, that is, their deductive or inferential powers. We distinguish the logical theories of the agents from the logic that we introduce in the next section to reason about a system and what agents in the system know. We can therefore model agents with different inferential powers, without affecting the logic itself.
Following common practice, we take deductive systems as acting over the terms of some term algebra. More precisely, assume a fixed finite signature Σ = (f 1 , . . . , f n ), where each f i is an operation symbol, with arity r i . Operation symbols of arity 0 are called constants. Assume a countable set Vars of variables. Define the term algebra T Σ as the least set such that Vars ⊆ T Σ , and for all f ∈ Σ of arity n, and for all t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ T Σ , then f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ T Σ . Intuitively, T Σ contains all the terms that can be built from the variables, constants, and operations in Σ. We say a term is a ground term if it contains no variables. Let T g Σ be the set of ground terms in T Σ . A ground substitution ρ is a mapping from variables in Vars to ground terms. The application of a ground substitution ρ to a term t, written ρ(t), essentially consists of replacing every variable in t with the ground term corresponding to t in ρ. Clearly, the application of a ground substitution to a term yields a ground term.
A Σ-deductive system D is a subset of ℘ fin (T Σ ) × T Σ . (We write ℘(X) for the set of subsets of X, and ℘ fin (X) for the set of finite subsets of X.) We often omit the signature Σ when it is clear from context. A deduction rule ({t 1 , . . . , t n }, t) of D is typically written t 1 , . . . , t n ⊲ t, and means that t can be immediately deduced from t 1 , . . . , t n . A deduction of t from a set Γ of terms is a sequence of ground terms t 1 , . . . , t n such that t n = t, and every t i is either (1) a term ρ(t ′ ), for some ground substitution ρ and some term t ′ ∈ Γ;
(2) a term ρ(t ′ ), for some ground substitution ρ and some term t ′ for which there is a deduction
We write Γ ⊢ D t if there is a deduction from Γ to t via deduction rules in D. By definition, we have t ⊢ D t for all terms t. 2 We will mainly be concerned with deductive systems that are decidable, that is, for which the problem of deciding whether a deduction of t from Γ exists is decidable, for a term t and a finite set of terms Γ. Moreover, it should be clear from the definitions that deductive systems are monotonic. In other words, if Γ ⊢ D t, then Γ ′ ⊢ D t when Γ ⊆ Γ ′ . Finally, observe that we do not impose any restriction on the formation of terms. The whole theory we develop in this paper could take as a starting point the notion of sorted term algebras [Higgins 1963 ], with little change; this would allow restrictions on terms to be imposed in a natural way.
Example 2.1. We give a deductive system that captures the capabilities of the Dolev-Yao adversary described in the introduction. Define the following Σ-deductive system DY, with signature Σ = (recv, has, encr, conc, inv) , where recv(m) represents the fact that the adversary has received the term m, has(m) represents the fact that the adversary possesses the term m (i.e., is able to extract message m from the messages he has received), encr(m, k) represents the encryption of term m with key k, conc(m 1 , m 2 ) represents the concatenation of terms m 1 and m 2 , and inv(k) represents the inverse of the key k: recv(m) ⊲ has(m) has(inv(k)), has(encr(m, k)) ⊲ has(m) has(conc(m 1 , m 2 )) ⊲ has(m 1 ) has(conc(m 1 , m 2 )) ⊲ has(m 2 ).
Assume further that Σ contains constants such as m, k 1 , k 2 . We can derive:
recv(encr(m, k 1 )), recv(encr(inv(k 1 ), k 2 )), recv(inv(k 2 )) ⊢ DY has(m).
In other words, it is possible for a Dolev-Yao adversary to derive the message m if he has received m encrypted under a key k 1 , the inverse of which he has received encrypted under a key k 2 , whose inverse he has received. To account for constructing new messages, consider the signature Σ ′ that extends Σ with a unary constructor constr, where constr(m) represents the fact that the adversary can construct the term m. We can account for this new constructor by adding the following deduction rules to DY: has(m) ⊲ constr(m) constr(k), constr(m) ⊲ constr(encr(m, k)) constr(m 1 ), constr(m 2 ) ⊲ constr(conc(m 1 , m 2 )).
For instance, we have recv(encr(m, k 1 )), recv(inv(k 1 )), recv(k 2 ) ⊢ DY constr(encr(m, k 2 )).
⊓ ⊔
In what sense can we use deductive systems to model explicit knowledge? Intuitively, the elements of the term algebra represent facts, and the deduction rules of the system model the inferencing capabilities of the agent-which facts can he deduce from other facts. This gloss raises another question, namely what to take as basic facts known to the agent without deduction, from which to initially start deriving other facts? Konolige [1986] calls these basic beliefs, and there are a number of approaches that can be followed. One approach is to simply posit a set of basic facts initially known to the agent (perhaps different basic facts are initially known at different states). This does not completely solve the problem, as it still requires determining which facts are initially known at every state. We pursue a different approach here, consistent with many well-known descriptions in the literature: we take the basic beliefs of an agent to be his observations. Intuitively, an observation is a fact that the agent can readily determine by examining his local state. We distinguish observations from other facts by using a unary constructor ob in the signature of the deductive systems we consider in subsequent sections.
Deductive Algorithmic Knowledge
We now introduce a propositional modal logic for reasoning about the implicit and explicit knowledge of an agent, where the explicit knowledge is formalized as a deductive system. In this section, we focus on a single agent. We extend to multiple agents in Section 6.
We define the logic L KD (Σ), over a signature Σ. We take primitive propositions to be ground terms T g Σ over the signature Σ. We use p to range over T g Σ , to emphasize that they are primitive propositions, and distinguish them from terms over the more general signatures described later. The language of the logic is obtained by starting with primitive propositions in T g Σ and closing off under negation, conjunction, the K operator, the X operator, and the Ob operator (applied to primitive propositions only). Intuitively, Kϕ is read as "the agent implicitly knows ϕ", Xϕ is read as "the agent explicitly knows ϕ, according to his deductive system", and Ob(p) is read as "the agent observes p". We define the usual abbreviations, ϕ ∨ ψ for ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), and ϕ ⇒ ψ for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ. We define true as an abbreviation for an arbitrary but fixed propositional tautology, and false as an abbreviation for ¬true.
To interpret the deductive algorithmic knowledge of an agent, we provide the agent with a deductive system in which to perform his deductions. As we discussed in last section, we want the agent to reason about observations he makes about his state; furthermore, because we will want to interpret formulas in L KD as terms over which the deductive system can reason (see the semantics of Xϕ below), we consider deductive systems defined over the signature Σ extended with a set Σ KD of constructors corresponding to the operators in our logic, that is, Σ KD = {ob, true, false, not, and, know, xknow}, where true, false have arity 0, ob, not, know, xknow have arity 1, and and has arity 2.
The semantics of the logic follows the standard possible-worlds presentation for modal logics of knowledge [Hintikka 1962] . A deductive algorithmic knowledge structure is a tuple M = (S, π, D), where S is a set of states, π is an interpretation for the primitive propositions, and D is a Σ ∪ Σ KDdeductive system. Every state s in S is of the form (e, O), where e captures the general state of the system, and O is a finite set of observations. Each observation in O is a primitive proposition, representing the observations that the agent has made at that state. 3 The details of the states are essentially irrelevant, as they are only used as a way to interpret the truth of the primitive propositions. We do not model how agent makes observations, or temporal relationships between states. A state simply represents a snapshot of the system under consideration. The interpretation π associates with every state the set of primitive propositions that are true at that state, so that for every primitive proposition p ∈ T g Σ , we have π(s)(p) ∈ {true, false}.
We make a distinction between a fact, represented by a primitive proposition p, and an observation of that fact, represented by the formula Ob(p). For instance, the fact that Alice holds an apple might be represented by the primitive proposition holds(alice, apple), which can be true or not at a state, while the fact that the agent has observed that Alice is holding an apple is represented by the formula Ob(holds(alice, apple)), which is true if and only if that observation is in the state of the agent. It is not necessarily the case that if Ob(p) holds at a state then p holds at that state. We therefore consider it possible that the agent makes unreliable observations. We can of course assume that observations are reliable by imposing a restriction on the interpretation π, by taking π((e, O))(p) = true whenever p ∈ O. More generally, we can impose restrictions on the models considered, such as observations being restricted to a specific subset of the primitive propositions, and so on. 4
Example 3.1. Models are representations of situations we want to analyze, for instance, by verifying that a situation satisfies a certain property. Suppose we wanted to specify the knowledge of a Dolev-Yao adversary, as mentioned in the introduction, in the context where there are principals exchanging messages according to a protocol. The deductive system used by the adversary is a slight extension of the deductive system DY from Example 2.1, extended to deal with observations. The security literature generally assumes a subterm relation on the messages exchanged by the protocol;
(See Abadi and Rogaway [2000] for motivations.) Consider a structure M = (S, π, DY ′ ), where we record at every state all messages intercepted by the adversary at that state. We restrict the observations at a state to be of the form recv(t), for ground terms t in which has does not occur.
The deductive system DY ′ is just DY extended with a rule making observations available to the deductive system: ob(recv(t)) ⊲ recv(t).
The interpretation π is defined so that π((e, O))(has(t)) = true if and only if there exists a term
In other words, has(t) holds at a state if t is a subterm of a message intercepted by the adversary. For instance, we can have s 1 be a state with observations {recv(encr(m, k 1 )), recv(encr(inv(k 1 ), k 2 ))}, and s 2 a state with observations {recv(encr(m, k 1 )), recv(encr(inv(k 1 ), k 2 )), recv(inv(k 2 ))}.
These states represent states where the adversary has intercepted particular messages. We shall see how to specify properties of M , such as the fact the adversary does not explicitly know at s 1 that he possesses m, despite π(s 1 )(has(m)) = true.
⊓ ⊔ Let M(Σ) be the set of all deductive algorithmic knowledge structures using Σ ∪ Σ KD -deductive systems. For a fixed Σ ∪ Σ KD -deductive system D, let M D (Σ) be the set of all deductive algorithmic knowledge structures using deductive system D.
We define what it means for a formula ϕ to be true at a state s of M , written (M, s) |= ϕ, inductively as follows. For the propositional fragment of the logic, the rules are straightforward.
To define the semantics of knowledge, we follow the standard approach due to Hintikka [1962] . We define a relation on the states that captures the states that the agent cannot distinguish based on the observations. Let s ∼ s ′ if and only if s = (e, O) and s ′ = (e ′ , O) for some e, e ′ , and set of observations O. Clearly, ∼ is an equivalence relation on the states.
To define the semantics of the X operator, we need to invoke the deductive system. To do this, we first define the translation of a formula ϕ of L KD (Σ) into a term ϕ T of the term algebra, in the completely obvious way: p T is p for any primitive proposition p (recall that primitive propositions are just terms in
The monotonicity of the deductive systems means that for a structure M with states s = (e, O),
Thus, explicit knowledge of facts is never lost when new observations are made. Finally, we interpret Ob(p) by checking whether p is one of the observations made by the agent:
Example 3.2. Consider Example 3.1. By definition of π, (M, s 1 ) |= K(has(m)) and (M, s 2 ) |= K(has(m)), so that at both states, the adversary implicitly knows he possesses message m. However, from the results of Example 2.1, we see that (M, s 2 ) |= X(has(m)), while (M, s 1 ) |= ¬X(has(m)). In other words, the adversary explicitly knows he possesses m at state s 2 (where he has intercepted the appropriate terms), but not at state s 1 . ⊓ ⊔ Example 3.3. The following deduction rules can be added to any deductive system to obtain a deductive system that captures a subset of the inferences that can be performed in propositional logic:
and(t, t ′ ) ⊲ t.
One advantage of these rules, despite the fact that they are incomplete, is that they can be used to perform very efficient (linear-time, in fact) propositional inference [McAllester 1993 ]. ⊓ ⊔ Example 3.4. We can easily let the agent explicitly reason about his deductive algorithmic knowledge by adding a rule t ⊲ xknow(t) (1) to his deductive system D. Thus, if M is a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure over D, and (M, s) |= Xϕ, then we have s = (e, O), with O ⊢ D ϕ T , and by the above rule, the deductive
It is possible to restrict the deductive algorithmic knowledge of an agent with respect to his own deductive algorithmic knowledge by suitably modifying rule (1), restricting it to apply only to a subset of the terms.
⊓ ⊔
There is a subtlety involved in any logic with a modal operator that we wish not to be subject to logical omniscience. Intuitively, such a logic forces one to be quite aware of what symbols are defined by abbreviation, and which are not. Earlier in this section, we defined true, false, ∨, and ⇒ by abbreviation, which means that any formula containing ∨ or ⇒ is really a formula containing ∧ and ¬. Thus, the agent cannot explicitly distinguish between ϕ ∨ ψ and ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ); they are the same formula in the logic, and the validity |= X(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ X(¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)) simply reflects this identity. Such a result seems to go against the main motivation for explicit knowledge, to ensure that knowledge is not closed under tautologies. Part of the problem here is simply that defining operators by abbreviation introduces inescapable equivalences. An easy way to circumvent this problem is to use a syntax that directly uses ∨, ⇒, and perhaps other connectives, rather than introducing them through abbreviations. We would then add similar constructors to the signature Σ KD , and extend the translation ϕ T accordingly. This gives full control on which tautologies are validated by explicit knowledge, and which are not.
Finally, it is worth pointing out the relationship between our framework and Konolige's [1986] . Roughly speaking, Konolige's framework corresponds to the deductive systems we described in the last section-it supplies a logical theory for the reasoning of an agent (albeit, in Konolige's case, a first-order logical theory). The logic in this section may be used to reason about the knowledge of agents who reason using Konolige's logical theories. In this sense, our logic is compatible with Konolige's framework. More interestingly, our framework semantically grounds the basic beliefs assumed by Konolige's framework: basic beliefs correspond to observations, which can be reasoned about independently of the belief of the agents.
Axiomatizations
In this section, we present a sound and complete axiomatization for reasoning about explicit knowledge given by a deductive system. Recall that a formula f is provable in an axiomatization if f can be proved using the axioms and rules of inference of the axiomatization. An axiomatization is sound with respect to a class M of structures if every formula provable in the axiomatization is valid in M; an axiomatization is complete with respect to M if every formula valid in M is provable in the axiomatization.
Clearly, for a fixed deductive system, the properties of X depend on that deductive system. Intuitively, we should be able to read off the properties of X from the deduction rules themselves. This is hardly surprising. Properties of the knowledge algorithms in the framework of algorithmic knowledge immediately translate to properties of the X operator. To adapt an example from Halpern, Moses, and Vardi [1994] , if a knowledge algorithm is sound, that is, it says the agent explicitly knows ϕ in a state if and only if ϕ is true at that state, then Xϕ ⇒ ϕ is valid in any structure using such a knowledge algorithm. What is interesting in the context of deductive algorithmic knowledge is that we can completely characterize the properties of X by taking advantage of the structure of the deductive systems. The remainder of this section makes this statement precise.
As a first step, we introduce an axiomatization for reasoning about deductive systems in general, independently of the actual deduction rules of the system. This will form the basis of later axiomatizations. First, we need axioms and inference rules capturing propositional reasoning in the logic:
Taut. All instances of propositional tautologies.
MP. From ϕ and ϕ ⇒ ψ infer ψ.
Axiom Taut can be replaced by an axiomatization of propositional tautologies [Enderton 1972 ]. The following well-known axioms and inference rules capture the properties of the knowledge operator [Hintikka 1962 ]:
We now turn to deductive algorithmic knowledge. Not surprisingly, Xϕ does not satisfy many properties, because no assumptions were made about the deductive systems. Deductive algorithmic knowledge is interpreted with respect to the observations at the current state, and two states are indistinguishable to an agent if the same observations are made at both states; therefore, agents know whether or not they explicitly know a fact. This is captured by the following axiom:
In the presence of K1-K5, it is an easy exercise to check that ¬Xϕ ⇒ K¬Xϕ is provable from X1. In addition, all observations are explicitly known. This fact is expressed by the following axiom:
Axiom X2 just formalizes the following property of deduction as defined in Section 2: for all terms t of a deductive system D, we have t ⊢ D t. Finally, we need to capture the fact that indistinguishable states have exactly the same observations:
It is easy to see that the formula ¬Ob(p) ⇒ K¬Ob(p) is provable from X3 in the presence of K1-K5.
Let AX consist of the axioms Taut, MP, K1-K5, and X1-X3. Without further assumptions on the deductive systems under consideration, AX completely characterizes reasoning about deductive algorithmic knowledge.
Theorem 4.1. The axiomatization AX is sound and complete for L KD (Σ) with respect to M(Σ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
If we want to reason about deductive algorithmic knowledge structures equipped with a specific deductive system, we can say more. We can essentially capture reasoning with respect to the specific deductive system within our logic. The basic idea is to translate deduction rules of the deductive system into formulas of L KD (Σ). A deduction rule of the form t 1 , . . . , t n ⊲ t in D is translated to a formula (Xt R 1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xt R n ) ⇒ Xt R , with the understanding that an empty conjunction is just true. We define the formula t R corresponding to the term t by induction on the structure of t:
and t R is t for all other terms t. We view the result of the translation as an axiom scheme, where the variables in t 1 , . . . , t n , t act as schema metavariables, to be replaced by appropriate elements of the term algebra. 5 It is easy to see that (t T ) R = t for all terms t. Furthermore, we do not translate constructors in Σ KD that appear under constructors in Σ within a term. (Intuitively, these constructors will never arise out of the translation of formulas given in Section 3.) Let AX D be the set of axioms derived in this way for the Σ ∪ Σ KDdeductive system D.
A simple argument shows that the axiomatization AX augmented with axioms AX D is not complete for M D (Σ), since there are formulas of the form Xψ that cannot be true in any structure in M D (Σ), namely, Xψ where ψ T is not derivable from any set of observations using the deductive system D. Thus, ¬Xψ is valid for those ψ, but the axioms above clearly cannot prove ¬Xψ. In other words, the axioms in AX D capture deducibility in ⊢ D , but not nondeducibility. We can however establish completeness with respect to a more general class of structures, intuitively, those structures using a deductive system containing at least the deduction rules in D. Let M D⊆ (Σ) be the class of all structures M such that there exists D ′ with D ⊆ D ′ and M ∈ M D ′ .
Theorem 4.2. The axiomatization AX augmented with axioms AX D is sound and complete for L KD (Σ) with respect to M D⊆ (Σ).
If we are willing to restrict the formulas to consider, we can get completeness with respect to M D (Σ). This follows directly from the intuition that the axiomatization can prove all deductions in D but not the nondeductions. First, a few definitions: a top-level occurrence of a deductive algorithmic knowledge subformula Xψ in ϕ is an occurrence that does not occur in the scope of an X operator. An occurrence of a subformula ψ is said to be positive if it occurs in the scope of an even number of negations. Proof. See Appendix A.
In particular, Theorem 4.3 implies that a formula of the form Xϕ is valid in M D (Σ) if and only if Xϕ is provable in the axiomatization AX augmented with axioms AX D .
Decision Procedures
In this section, we study the decision problem for L KD (Σ), that is, the problem of determining, for a given formula, whether it is satisfiable. Again, we emphasize that we are considering only a single agent here; allowing multiple agents changes the complexity, as we shall see in Section 6. Since L KD (Σ) logic extends the logic of knowledge where the knowledge operator is interpreted over an equivalence relation (in our case, the relation ∼ saying that two states contain the same observations), and since the complexity of the decision problem for the latter is NP-complete [Ladner 1977] , the difficulty of deciding satisfiability for L KD (Σ) is at least as hard. We can use the fact that there is a tight relationship between these logics to get our complexity results.
We measure complexity in terms of the size of the formulas. Define the size |t| of a term t to be the number of symbols required to write t, where each operation symbol is counted as a single symbol. If Γ is a finite set of terms, then |Γ| is just the sum of the sizes of the terms in Γ. Similarly, the size |ϕ| of a formula is defined to be the number of symbols required to write ϕ, where again each operation symbol is counted as a single symbol.
We can now state our complexity results. It turns out that adding a deductive algorithmic knowledge operator to the logic of knowledge over an equivalence relation does not change the complexity of the decision problem. Deciding satisfiability of a formula of L KD (Σ) is essentially the same as deciding satisfiability of a formula in the logic of knowledge over an equivalence relation, with the difference that to account for deductive algorithmic knowledge, we need to construct a deductive system with specific deduction rules that suffice to satisfy the subformulas Xϕ appearing in the formula. What happens if we fix a specific deductive system, and want to establish whether a formula ϕ is satisfiable in a structure over that deductive system? The difficulty of this problem depends intrinsically on the difficulty of deciding whether a deduction Γ ⊢ D t exists in D. Since this problem may be arbitrarily difficult for certain deductive systems D, reasoning in our logic can be arbitrarily difficult over those deductive systems. The logic L KD (Σ) includes the propositional connectives, which gives us an easy lower bound.
Theorem 5.2. For any given Σ ∪ Σ KD -deductive system D, the problem of deciding whether a formula ϕ of
On the other hand, if the deductive system is decidable in nondeterministic polynomial time (i.e., if the problem of deciding whether a deduction Γ ⊢ D t exists in D can be solved by a nondeterministic Turing machine in time polynomial in |Γ| and |t|), then the decision problem for L KD remains relatively easy, at least with respect to models of a reasonable size. More precisely, let M n D (Σ) be the class of all deductive algorithmic knowledge structures using deductive system D, where the number of observations at every state is at most n.
Theorem 5.3. For any given Σ ∪ Σ KD -deductive system D that is decidable in nondeterministic polynomial time and for any polynomial P (x), the problem of deciding whether a formula ϕ of
There is a class of deductive systems that can be efficiently decided (i.e., in polynomial time) and thus by Theorem 5.3 lead to a reasonable complexity for L KD (Σ) interpreted over those systems. Call a deduction local in a deductive system D if every proper subterm of a term in the deduction is either a proper subterm of t, a proper subterm of a member of Γ, or appears as a subterm of a deduction rule in D. For any deductive system D, whether a local deduction of t from Γ exists can be decided in time polynomial in |Γ| and |t|. 
Proof. Immediate from the property of local deductive system, and from Theorem 5.3.
Reasoning about Multiple Agents
The framework we have described extends to multiple agents in a straightforward way. This extension is similar to the extension of modal logics of knowledge to multiple agents [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] . The only addition is that we need to equip every agent with a deductive system.
Suppose a group of agents, named 1, . . . , n for simplicity. We define the logic L KD n (Σ) as we did L KD (Σ), except that the operators K i , X i , and Ob i are indexed by an agent. A priori, there is no difficulty in giving a semantics to this logic as we have done in Section 3. Unfortunately, this does not let an agent explicitly reason about another agent's knowledge. In order to do this, we need to modify and extend the framework. As before, we consider deductive systems over a signature Σ extended with a set Σ KD n of constructors given by
where true, false have arity 0, ob i , not, know i , xknow i have arity 1, and and has arity 2.
A deductive algorithmic knowledge structure with n agents is a tuple M = (S, π, D 1 , . . . , D n ), where S is a set of states, π is an interpretation for the primitive propositions, and D i is a Σ ∪ Σ KD ndeductive system. Every state s in S is of the form (e, O 1 , . . . , O n ), where e captures the general state of the system, and O i is a finite set of observations from T g Σ , representing the observations that agent i has made at that state. The interpretation π associates with every state the set of primitive propositions true at that state, so that for all primitive proposition p ∈ T g Σ , we have π(s)(p) ∈ {true, false}.
Let M n (Σ) be the set of all deductive algorithmic knowledge structures using Σ ∪ Σ KD n -deductive systems for each agent. For fixed Σ ∪ Σ KD n -deductive systems D 1 , . . . , D n , let M D 1 ,...,Dn (Σ)
be the set of all deductive algorithmic knowledge structures for n agents with deductive systems D 1 , . . . , D n (i.e., agent i uses deductive system D i ). The remaining definitions generalize in a similar way. We define, for each agent, a relation on the states that captures the states that the agent cannot distinguish, based on his observations. More precisely, let s ∼ i s ′ if and only s = (e, O 1 , . . . , O n ) and s ′ = (e ′ , O ′ 1 , . . . , O ′ n ), for some e, e ′ and sets of observations
The translation of a formula ϕ into a term ϕ T of the deductive system now takes into account the name of the agents. As expected, p T is p for any primitive proposition p,
The semantics is just like that of Section 3, except with the following rules for K i ϕ, X i ϕ, and Ob i (p):
Example 6.1. Kaplan and Schubert [2000] study a phenomenon they call simulative inference where, roughly speaking, an agent can reconstruct the reasoning of another agent. We can capture this phenomenon by making suitable assumptions on an agent's deductive system. (Kaplan and Schubert work in a different setting-they assume that the inference engine is explicitly told formulas, and thus work in a setting similar to that of belief revision [Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson 1985] .) Say that a deductive system D i for agent i permits simulative inference of agent j with D j if D i contains a rule ob j (t) ⊲ xknow j (ob j (t)), and for every rule t 1 , . . . , t k ⊲ t of D j , there is a corresponding rule xknow j (t 1 ), . . . , xknow j (t k ) ⊲ xknow j (t) in D i . It is then easy to check that if we have (M, s) |= X j ϕ for some state s = (e, O 1 , . . . , O n ) with {p 1 , . . . , p k } ⊆ O j , and (M, s) |= X i Ob j (p 1 ) ∧ · · · ∧ X i Ob j (p k ), then (M, s) |= X i X j ϕ. Note that this derivation assumes that the agent i can explicitly determine that agent j has observed p 1 , . . . , p k . ⊓ ⊔
As far as axiomatizations are concerned, we can essentially lift the results of Section 4. It suffices to consider an axiomatization where K1-K5 now refer to K i rather than just K. For instance, K1 becomes K i ϕ ∧ K i (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ K i ψ, for every agent i. In a similar way, the axiom X1 simply becomes X i ϕ ⇒ K i X i ϕ. For X2 and X3, we need to further restrict the observations to be those of the agent under consideration: Ob i (p) ⇒ X i Ob i (p), and Ob i (p) ⇒ K i Ob i (p). Let AX n be the resulting axiomatization. Theorem 6.2. The axiomatization AX n is sound and complete for L KD n (Σ) with respect to M n (Σ).
Proof. See Appendix C.
As in the single agent case, we can capture the reasoning with respect to specific deductive systems (one per agent) within our logic. Again, we translate deduction rules of the deductive systems into formulas of L KD n (Σ). Consider the deductive system D i for agent i. A deduction rule of the form t 1 , . . . , t n ⊲ t in D i is translated to a formula (
We define the formula t R corresponding to the term t by induction on the structure of t: true R is true,
and t R is t for all other terms t. (As in Section 4, such a translation yields an axiom schema, where we view the variables in t 1 , . . . , t n , t as schema metavariables, to be replaced by appropriate elements of the term algebra.) Let AX D i n be the set of axioms derived in this way for the deductive system D i of agent i.
As in the single agent case, we cannot capture exactly the reasoning in structures where agent i is using deductive system D i , since we cannot capture nondeducibility within the logic. Therefore, completeness is established with respect to a larger class of structures. Let M D 1 ,...,Dn⊆ (Σ) be the class of all structures M such that there exists D ′ 1 , . . . , D ′ n with D 1 ⊆ D ′ 1 , . . . , D n ⊆ D ′ n and M ∈ M D ′ 1 ,...,D ′ n . Theorem 6.3. The axiomatization AX n augmented with axioms AX D 1 n , . . . , AX Dn n is sound and complete for L KD n (Σ) with respect to M D 1 ,...,Dn⊆ (Σ).
The complexity of the decision problem in the case of multiple agents reflects the complexity of the decision problem for the modal logic of knowledge with multiple agents. The logic L KD n (Σ) extends the logic of knowledge over equivalence relations for n agents, and it is known that the decision problem for that logic is PSPACE-complete [Halpern and Moses 1992] . As in the single agent case, adding deductive algorithmic knowledge does not affect the complexity of the decision problem with respect to arbitrary deductive systems. Theorem 6.4. If n ≥ 2, the problem of deciding whether a formula ϕ of L KD n (Σ) is satisfiable in M n (Σ) is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. See Appendix C.
There is no clear candidate for an equivalent of Theorem 5.3 in the multiple agents context. Assuming every agent uses a tractable deductive system yields an easy EXPTIME upper bound on the decision problem for L KD n (Σ), while the best lower bound we obtain is the same as the one in Theorem 6.4, that is, the problem is PSPACE-hard.
Conclusion
We have described in this paper an approach to combining implicit knowledge interpreted over possible worlds with a notion of explicit knowledge based on a deductive system that allows agents to derive what they explicitly know. This additional structure, the agent's deductive system, can be used to completely characterize the properties of the explicit knowledge operator. More specifically, we can derive sound and complete axiomatizations for the logic in a uniform way. There are many approaches to modeling explicit knowledge in the literature, with many different philosophical intuitions and interpretations. The model in this paper is based on a conception of explicit knowledge (viz., obtained from inference rules) that goes back at least to Konolige [1986] , and aims at capturing a particularly computational interpretation of explicit knowledge based on observations. We remark that our model is consistent with a number of epistemological theories [Pollock and Cruz 1999] that argue that all knowledge is ultimately derived from observations. While the framework extends to multiple agents in a straightforward way, there are many issues that still remain to be addressed at that level. For instance, a natural question is what happens when we move to more dynamic models, where the observations are taken over time. There are interesting issues that arise, especially when we assume that agents do not share a clock to synchronize their observations. We hope to explore this extension in future work.
What is our framework good for? Because deductive algorithmic knowledge is a special case of algorithmic knowledge, any situation that can be modeled in our framework can also be modeled in the original algorithmic knowledge framework. The one advantage of our logic, however, is that it admits sound and complete axiomatizations derivable directly from the deductive systems. Therefore, we can devise useful proof systems for interesting classes of applications, corresponding to different deductive systems.
The framework in this paper sheds light on the epistemic content of deductive systems, in that we provide a logic in which we can reason about implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge derived from a deductive system. An interesting question is whether this approach can shed light on the epistemic content of probabilistic deductive systems, of the kind found in the recent probabilistic deductive database literature [Lukasiewicz 1999; Lakshmanan and Sadri 2001] . Presumably, the ideas developed by Halpern and Pucella [2005] may be applicable in this setting. of this paper. Special thanks to Joseph Halpern for carefully reading a version of this paper and pointing out problems with the original statements of Theorems 4.2 and 6.3, and for suggesting Theorem 4.3. Anonymous referees also did a wonderful job of suggesting improvements. This work was supported in part by NSF under grant CTC-0208535, by ONR under grant N00014-02-1-0455, by the DoD Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) program administered by the ONR under grant N00014-01-1-0795, and by AFOSR under grant F49620-02-1-0101.
A Proofs for Section 4
The proof of soundness and completeness in Section 4 rely on fairly standard canonical model constructions [Hughes and Cresswell 1996] . We review the required notions here, for completeness. A canonical model is a model whose states are consistent sets of formulas, with the property that valid formulas of the logic are true at states of the canonical model. Recall that a formula ϕ is consistent (with respect to an axiomatization AX) if ¬ϕ is not provable from AX. A finite set of formulas {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } is consistent if and only if ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ n is consistent. An infinite set F of formulas is consistent if and only if every finite subset of F is consistent. A set of formulas is maximally consistent if it is not properly contained in any other consistent set of formulas. We assume some familiarity with properties of maximally consistent sets of formulas. Such properties include, for V a maximally consistent set of formulas: for all ϕ, exactly one of ϕ or ¬ϕ is in V ; ϕ and ψ are both in V if and only if ϕ ∧ ψ is in V ; if ϕ and ϕ ⇒ ψ are in V , then ψ is in V ; every provable formula is in V (in particular, every axiom of AX is in V ). Some definitions will be useful. First, given a set V of formulas, let V /K = {ϕ | Kϕ ∈ V }. Let C be the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas of L KD (Σ).
Lemma A.1.
(1) ≈ is an equivalence relation on C.
(2) If V ≈ U , then V /Ob = U/Ob.
Proof.
(1) The proof that ≈ is an equivalence relation is completely standard, and relies on the axioms K1-K5 [Hughes and Cresswell 1996] .
(2) Let p ∈ V /Ob ⊆ V . Since V is maximally consistent, all instances of X3 are in V , and thus Ob(p) ⇒ KOb(p) is in V , so by MP, KOb(p) ∈ V , and thus Ob(p) ∈ V /K ⊆ U . Therefore, Ob(p) ∈ U , and V /Ob ⊆ U/Ob. Since ≈ is an equivalence relation, V ≈ U implies that U ≈ V , and by the same argument, we get U/Ob ⊆ V /Ob.
(3) This follows easily from X1. Assume Xψ ∈ V . Then KXψ ∈ V by X1, and thus Xψ ∈ V /K, and since V ≈ U , Xψ ∈ U . The converse direction follows from the fact that ≈ is symmetric.
Proof. Proving soundness is straightforward. For completeness, we prove the equivalent statement that if ϕ is consistent (i.e., ¬ϕ is not provable from the axiomatization AX), then ϕ is satisfiable in some structure in M(Σ). The satisfying structure will be constructed from the set of maximally consistent formulas.
Let ϕ be a consistent formula of L KD (Σ), and let Sub(ϕ) be the set of subformulas of ϕ (including ϕ itself). Since ϕ is consistent, there is a set V ϕ ∈ C with ϕ ∈ V ϕ with |V ϕ /Ob| < ∞: first construct a set V starting with ϕ, adding Ob(p) for every observation Ob(p) appearing in ϕ if Ob(p) ∧ ϕ is consistent, and adding ¬Ob(p) for every observation Ob(p) either not appearing in ϕ or inconsistent with ϕ; it easy to establish that V is consistent, so V is extensible to a maximally consistent set V ϕ with |V ϕ /Ob| < ∞.
Let O ϕ = V ϕ /Ob. Let [V ϕ ] ≈ be the ≈-equivalence class that contains V ϕ . We will use the sets of formulas [V ϕ ] ≈ as states of our structure. More specifically, define the deductive algorithmic knowledge structure M ϕ = (S ϕ , π ϕ , D ϕ ) by taking:
To simplify the discussion, and because O ϕ is fixed in M ϕ , we refer to the state (s V , O ϕ ) as simply s V ; for instance, we freely write s V ∈ S ϕ . We can check that D ϕ defines a Σ ∪ Σ KD -deductive system. Decidability of D ϕ holds trivially, since D ϕ contains finitely many deduction rules, as Sub(ϕ) is finite. Thus, M ϕ is a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure. We now show that for all s V ∈ S ϕ and all subformulas ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ), we have (M ϕ , s V ) |= ψ if and only if ψ ∈ V , by induction on the structure of formulas. The cases for true, false, primitive propositions, conjunction, and negation are straightforward, using maximal consistency of V .
For Ob(p), first assume that (M ϕ , s V ) |= Ob(p). This means that p ∈ O ϕ , so p ∈ V ϕ /Ob, and since V ϕ /Ob = V /Ob, p ∈ V /Ob, and thus Ob(p) ∈ V . Conversely, if Ob(p) ∈ V , then p ∈ V /Ob = V ϕ /Ob, so that p ∈ O ϕ , and thus (M ϕ , s V ) |= Ob(p). Now, consider a deductive algorithmic knowledge formula Xψ. First, assume that we have
, and thus Ob(p) ∈ V by the induction hypothesis; by X2, XOb(p) ∈ V .
Otherwise, by construction of D ϕ , there must exist a rule ⊲ψ T in D ϕ . In other words, Xψ ∈ V ϕ . Since V ≈ V ϕ by choice of S ϕ , we get Xψ ∈ V , following Lemma A.1. Conversely, assume that
For a knowledge formula Kψ, the result follows from essentially the same proof as that of Halpern and Moses [1992] . We give it here for completeness. First, assume (M ϕ , s V ) |= Kψ. It follows that (V /K) ∪ {¬ψ} is not consistent. (Otherwise, it would be contained in some maximal consistent set U in C, and by construction, we would have V /K ⊆ U , and thus V ≈ U , and hence s V ∼ s U ; but since we have ¬ψ ∈ U , we have ψ ∈ U , and by the induction hypothesis,
is not consistent, there must be some finite subset {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k , ¬ψ} which is not consistent. By propositional reasoning, we can derive that ϕ 1 ⇒ (ϕ 2 ⇒ (. . . ⇒ (ϕ k ⇒ ψ) . . . )) is provable, and thus K(ϕ 1 ⇒ (ϕ 2 ⇒ (. . . ⇒ (ϕ k ⇒ ψ) . . . ))) is provable by K2. It is straightforward to derive from this by induction, propositional reasoning, and K1, that Kϕ 1 ⇒ (Kϕ 2 ⇒ (. . . ⇒ (Kϕ k ⇒ Kψ) . . . )) is provable. Thus, Kϕ 1 ⇒ (Kϕ 2 ⇒ (. . . ⇒ (Kϕ k ⇒ Kψ) . . . )) ∈ V . Because ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ∈ V /K, we have Kϕ 1 , . . . , Kϕ k ∈ V , and by repeated applications of MP, we have Kψ ∈ V , as desired. Conversely, if we assume Kψ ∈ V , then ψ ∈ V /K. Let s U be an arbitrary state of S ϕ . By construction of M ϕ , V ≈ U and thus V /K ⊆ U . Therefore, we have ψ ∈ U , and by the induction hypothesis, (M ϕ , s U ) |= ψ. Since s U was arbitrary, and since s U ∼ s V (immediate by the definition of S ϕ ), this means that (M ϕ , s V ) |= Kψ.
Completeness of AX now follows immediately. Since ϕ ∈ V ϕ and ϕ ∈ Sub(ϕ), we have (M ϕ , s V ϕ ) |= ϕ, and thus ϕ is satisfiable.
Proof. Soundness is again straightforward. For completeness, we prove the equivalent statement that if ϕ is consistent (i.e., if ¬ϕ is not provable from the axiomatization AX augmented with the axioms AX D ) then ϕ is satisfiable in some structure in M D (Σ). The procedure is exactly the one that is used to prove Theorem 4.1, except with a different deductive system D ϕ .
We simply indicate where the proof differs from that of Theorem 4.1, and let the reader fill in the details. We construct, for a given ϕ, a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure M ϕ = (S ϕ , π ϕ , D ϕ ), where S ϕ and π ϕ are constructed as in Theorem 4.1, and D ϕ is given by
We can check that M ϕ is a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure in M D⊆ (Σ). The deductive system D ϕ has the following interesting property: if {ob(p) | p ∈ O ϕ } ⊢ D ψ T , then there is a rule ⊲ψ T in D ϕ . In other words, every term ψ T derivable from the rules in D is derivable directly with a single rule in D ϕ . Here is the proof of this property. Assume {ob(p) | p ∈ O ϕ } ⊢ D ψ T . Clearly, it is sufficient to show that Xψ ∈ V ϕ . If ψ is Ob(p) for some p ∈ O ϕ , then Ob(p) ∈ V ϕ , so by X2, XOb(p) ∈ V ϕ . Otherwise, there must exist a deduction t 1 , . . . , t m in D such that t m = ψ T is a conclusion of the deduction. We show by induction on the length of the deduction that for every i, X(t i ) R ∈ V ϕ . For the base case i = 1, we have two cases. If t 1 is ob(t) for some t ∈ O ϕ , then (t 1 ) R = Ob(t), and XOb(t) ∈ V ϕ follows from X2 and the fact that t ∈ O ϕ implies that Ob(t) ∈ V ϕ . If t 1 follows from the application of a deduction rule in D, with no antecedents, then by construction, there is an instance of this rule in V ϕ , of the form true ⇒ X(t 1 ) R , and thus X(t 1 ) R ∈ V ϕ . For the inductive case i > 1, again, there are two cases. If t i is ob(t) for some t ∈ O ϕ , then the result X(t 1 ) R follows as in the base case. Otherwise, there is a rule t ′ 1 , . . . , t ′ k ⊲ t ′ in D such that for some ground substitution ρ such that ρ(t ′ ) = t i and for all j ∈ 1..k, ρ(t ′ j ) appears in the deduction before term t i . By construction, there is an instance of
and by induction hypothesis, we have X(t ′ i j ) R ∈ V ϕ for each i j < i. Thus, by MP, we have X(t i ) R ∈ V ϕ . Since ψ T = t m , the last element of the deduction, we get that X(ψ T ) R = Xψ is in V ϕ , as desired.
The rest of the proof follows as before.
The following lemma is useful for proving Theorem 4.3. Roughly, it says that any formula can be written as an equivalent formula where all instances of the negation operator occurs before a primitive proposition, an observation formula, or an explicit knowledge formula. To simplify the presentation of the lemma, we write the resulting formula using operator ∨, as well as operator Lϕ, which is just an abbreviation for ¬K¬ϕ.
Lemma A.2. Every formula ϕ of L KD (Σ) is logically equivalent to a formula ϕ written using p, ¬p, Ob(p), ¬Ob(p) (for primitive propositions p) and Xϕ and ¬Xϕ (for ϕ in L KD (Σ)), and the operators ∧, ∨, K, and L. Moreover, if every top-level occurrence of a subformula Xψ is positive in ϕ, then no occurrence of Xψ in ϕ is in the scope of a negation.
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows directly from the following laws, which permit one to move negations into a formula as far down as they go:
The second part of the lemma follows by observing that the laws above preserve the evenness or oddness of the number of negations under the scope of which each subformula Xψ appears. Proof. Let ϕ be of the required form. By Lemma A.2, ϕ is also of the required form, and moreover is such that negations only appear in front of p, Ob(p), or Xψ. Since each occurrence is Xψ in ϕ is positive, this means that every Xψ appears unnegated in ϕ. Let M = (S, π, D) be an arbitrary model in M D (Σ), and let M D ′ = (S, π, D ′ ) be the corresponding model for D ′ ⊇ D. We claim that for all s ∈ S, (M, s) |= ϕ if and only if (M D ′ , s) |= ϕ. This is easily established by induction on the structure of ϕ. (The key point is that we do not need to consider the case ¬Xψ, which is guaranteed not to occur in ϕ.) Since s was arbitrary, we have M |= ϕ if and only if M D ′ |= ϕ. Now, assume ϕ is valid in M D (Σ). Let M D ′ = (S, π, D ′ ) be an arbitrary model in M D⊆ (Σ), and let M = (S, π, D). Since ϕ is valid in M D (Σ), M |= ϕ; by our result above, M D ′ |= ϕ. Since M D ′ was arbitrary, we have ϕ is valid in M D⊆ (Σ).
Conversely, assume ϕ is provable in the axiomatization AX augmented with axioms AX D . By Theorem 4.2, ϕ is valid in M D⊆ (Σ). Since M D (Σ) ⊆ M D⊆ (Σ), then ϕ is certainly valid in M D .
B Proofs for Section 5
We assume the terminology and notation of [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] for the modal logic of knowledge over an arbitrary equivalence relation; we call this logic L K , and let f, g range over formulas of L K . (This notation will let us distinguish L K formulas from L KD (Σ) formulas when they occur in the same statements.) The logic L K is interpreted over L K -structures, that is, Kripke structures (S, K, π) with an arbitrary equivalence relation K over the states that is used to interpret the modal operator; the satisfaction relation is written (M, s) |= K f , and is defined just like |=, but using the equivalence relation K over the states rather than the ∼ relation, and without the X and Ob operators. We write K(s) for {s ′ | (s, s ′ ) ∈ K}. The following small model result for L K , due to Ladner [1977] , is central to most of the proofs in this section.
Theorem B.1. [Ladner 1977 ] Given f an L K formula, if f is satisfiable, then f is satisfiable in an L K -structure M = (S, K, π) where |S| ≤ |f |, and K is the universal relation, that is, K = S × S.
Our result will follow by relating the complexity of L KD (Σ) to the complexity of L K . We can easily reduce the decision problem for L K to our logic, by simply ignoring the Xϕ formulas. Consider the following construction. Let f be a formula of L K . Let p 1 , . . . , p k be the primitive propositions appearing in f . We first come up with an encoding of these primitive propositions into the language of Σ. For example, we can take p 1 to be true, p 2 to be not(true), p 3 to be not(not(true)), and so forth. Let t p be the term encoding the primitive proposition p. Letf be the formula obtained by replacing every instance of a primitive proposition p in f by t p . Note that |f | is polynomial in |f |, and thatf contains no instance of the X operator. Lemma B.2. Given f an L K formula, and given D an arbitrary KD deductive system over Σ, the following are equivalent:
(1) f is satisfiable in an L K -structure;
(2)f is satisfiable in M D (Σ);
(3)f is satisfiable in M(Σ).
Proof.
(1) ⇒ (2): Assume f is satisfiable in an L K -structure. By Theorem B.1, we know that there exists an L K -structure M = (S, K, π) where K is an equivalence relation on S and (M, s) |= K f for some s ∈ S. 6 Let {[s] K | s ∈ S} be the set of equivalence classes of K, of which there are at most |f |. We encode these equivalence classes using an encoding similar to that for primitive propositions. Let false, not(false), not(not(false)), . . . be an encoding of these equivalence classes, where we denote by t s the encoding of and π ′ is given as follows. For a term t p and state s, π ′ ((s, {t s }))(t p ) = π(s)(p). For all other terms t, we take π ′ ((s, {t s }))(t) = false. It is easy to check by induction on the structure of f that if (M, s) |= K f , then (M ′ , (s, {t s })) |=f . Here are the interesting cases of the induction. If f is a primitive proposition p, then by assumption, (M, s) |= K p, so π(s)(p) = true; thus, π ′ ((s, {t s }))(t p ) = true, and (M ′ , (s, {t s })) |= t p . If f is Kg, then by assumption, (M, s) |= K Kg, so that for all s ′ ∈ K(s), (M, s ′ ) |= K g. By the induction hypothesis, we have for all s ′ ∈ K(s), (M ′ , (s ′ , {t s ′ })) |=ĝ, which is equivalent to saying that for all (s ′ , {t s ′ }) ∼ (s, {t s }) (since t s ′ = t s exactly when s ′ ∈ K(s)), (M ′ , (s ′ , {t s ′ })) |=ĝ, and thus (M ′ , (s, {t s })) |= Kĝ, as required.
(2) ⇒ (3): This is immediate, since M D (Σ) ⊆ M(Σ).
(3) ⇒ (1): Assumef is satisfiable in a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure M = (S, π, D ′ ), that is, (M, s) |=f for some s ∈ S. Construct the L K -structure M ′ = (S, K, π ′ ) by taking π ′ (s)(p) = true if and only if π(s)(t p ) = true, and taking K to be ∼. It is easy to check by induction on the structure of f that if (M, s) |=f , then (M ′ , s) |= K f . Here are the interesting cases of the induction. If f is a primitive proposition p, then by assumption, (M, s) |= t p , so that π(s)(t p ) = true. Thus means π ′ (s)(p) = true, and thus (M ′ , s) |= K p. If f is Kg, then by assumption, (M, s) |= Kĝ, that is, for all s ′ ∼ s, (M, s ′ ) |=ĝ. By the induction hypothesis, this yields for all s ′ ∼ s, (M ′ , s ′ ) |= K g, which is equivalent to the fact that for all s ′ ∈ K(s), (M ′ , s ′ ) |= K g, that is, (M ′ , s) |= K Kg, as required.
Lemma B.2 says that we can relate the satisfiability of an arbitrary formula of L K to that of a formula of L KD . We can similarly relate the satisfiability of an arbitrary formula of L KD to that of a formula of L K , in much the same way. More precisely, given ϕ ∈ L KD (Σ), letφ be defined as follows. The set T g Σ is countable, so let {p t | t ∈ T g Σ } be a countable set of primitive propositions corresponding to the ground terms of T Σ . Similarly, the set of formulas {Xψ | ψ ∈ L KD (Σ)} is countable, so let {q ψ | ψ ∈ L KD (Σ)} be a countable set of primitive propositions where q ψ corresponds to the formula Xψ. Finally, let {r t | t ∈ T g Σ } be a countable set of primitive propositions where r t corresponds to the formula Ob(t). Letφ be the translation of ϕ obtained by replacing every occurrence of a term t in T g Σ by p t , every occurrence of a formula Xψ by the corresponding q ψ , and every occurrence of a formula Ob(t) by the corresponding r t , in conjunction with formulas r t ⇔ Kr t for all observations Ob(t) appearing in ϕ, formulas q ψ ⇔ Kq ψ for all Xψ appearing in ϕ, and formulas r t ⇒ q Ob(t) for all observations Ob(t) appearing in ϕ. This translation is essentially compositional: ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 is logically equivalent toφ 1 ∧φ 2 , ¬ϕ is logically equivalent to ¬φ, and Kϕ is logically equivalent to Kφ. Note that |φ| is polynomial in |ϕ|.
Proof. Assume ϕ is satisfiable in M(Σ), that is, there is a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure M = (S, π, D) such that (M, s) |= ϕ for some s ∈ S. Construct an L K -structure M ′ = (S, K, π ′ ) by taking π ′ (s)(p t ) = π(s)(t), π ′ (s)(q ψ ) = true if and only if (M, s) |= Xψ, ϕ ′ (s)(r t ) = true if and only if (M, s) |= Ob(t), and K is simply ∼. It is easy to check by induction on the structure of ϕ that if (M, s) |= ϕ, then (M ′ , s) |= Kφ . Here are the interesting cases of the induction. If ϕ is a ground term t, then by assumption, (M, s) |= t, and π(s)(t) = true. This yields π ′ (s)(p t ) = true, and (M ′ , s) |= K p t . If ϕ is Xψ, then by assumption, (M, s) |= Xψ, and therefore π ′ (s)(q ψ ) = true, so that (M ′ , s) |= K q ψ . If ϕ is Ob(p), then by assumption (M, s) |= Ob(p), therefore π ′ (s)(r p ) = true, so that (M ′ , s) |= K r p . If ϕ is Kψ, then by assumption, (M, s) |= Kψ, that is, for all s ′ ∼ s, (M, s ′ ) |= ψ. By the induction hypothesis, and the definition of K, we have for all s ′ ∈ K(s), (M ′ , s ′ ) |= Kψ , that is, (M ′ , s) |= K Kψ, as required.
Conversely, assumeφ is satisfied in some L K -structure. By Theorem B.1, we know that there exists an L K -structure M = (S, K, π) where |S| ≤ |φ| and (M, s) |= Kφ for some s ∈ S. Let {[s] K | s ∈ S} be the set of equivalence classes of K, of which there are at most |φ|, which is polynomial in |ϕ|. Let t 1 , t 2 , . . . be an encoding of these equivalence classes using terms t i ∈ T g Σ such that no Ob(t i ) appears in ϕ. We denote by t s the term encoding the class Here are the interesting cases of the induction. If ϕ is a term t, then by assumption, (M, s) |= K p t , so that π(s)(p t ) = true. Thus, we have π ′ ((s, {t s } ∪ O(s)))(t) = true, and (M ′ , (s, {t s } ∪ O(s))) |= t. If ϕ is Xψ, then we have by assumption (M, s) |= K q ψ , and so π(s)(q ψ ) = true, meaning that ({t s }, ψ T ) is a deduction rule in D, and thus (M ′ , (s, {t s } ∪ O(s))) |= Xψ. If ϕ is Ob(t), then by assumption (M, s) |= r t , so that π(s)(r t ) = true. Thus, t ∈ O(s), and therefore
. This certainly implies, by the assumptions on the encoding, that t s = t s ′ , and thus s ′ ∈ K(s). Proof. For the lower bound, we show how to reduce from the decision problem of L K . Let f be a formula of L K . By Lemma B.2, f is satisfiable if and only iff is satisfiable in M(Σ). Thus, the complexity of the decision problem for L K is a lower bound for our decidability problem, that is, NP. For the upper bound, we need to exhibit a nondeterministic polynomial time algorithm that decides if ϕ ∈ L KD (Σ) is satisfiable. We will use the decision problem for L K itself as an algorithm. By Lemma B.3, ϕ is satisfiable if and only ifφ is satisfiable, so we can simply invoke the NP algorithm for L K satisfiability onφ.
Proof. The lower bound follows from Lemma B.2. Let f be an L K formula; f is satisfiable if and only iff is satisfiable over M D (Σ) structures. Since the decision problem for L K is NP-complete, the lower bound follows.
The following small model result for L KD (Σ) over M n D (Σ) is needed in the proof of Theorem 5.3. Define the size |M | of a model M to be the sum of the sizes of the states, where the size of a state (e, {p 1 , . . . , p k }) is 1 + |p 1 | + · · · + |p k |.
Proof. Assume ϕ is satisfiable in some structure M . Let M 1 = (S 1 , K 1 , π 1 ) be the L K -structure obtained by the construction in Lemma B.3, with (M 1 , s 1 ) |= Kφ , for some s 1 = (e, O) in S 1 . By Lemma B.1, we know thatφ is satisfied in an L K -structure M 2 = (S 2 , K 2 , π 2 ) where |S 2 | ≤ |φ|, K 2 is a universal relation on S 2 (that is, K 2 = S 2 × S 2 ), and (M 2 , s 2 ) |= Kφ for some s 2 ∈ S 2 . We reconstruct a satisfying deductive algorithmic knowledge structure from M 2 . Specifically, define M ′ = (S ′ , π ′ , D) by taking S ′ = {(s, O) | s ∈ S 2 } (where O is the set of observations at state s 1 ), and π ′ ((s, O))(t) = π 2 (s)(p t ). Because the construction of Lemma B.3 does not change the number of observations at a state and M ∈ M P (|ϕ|) , we have |s 1 | ≤ P (|ϕ|), and thus p∈O |p| ≤ P (|ϕ|). Thus, |M ′ | is polynomial in |S 2 |P (|ϕ|) ≤ |φ|P (|ϕ|), that is, polynomial in |ϕ|, as required. A straightforward induction on the structure of ϕ shows that if (M, s) |= ϕ (or equivalently, by Lemma B.3, (M 1 , s 1 ) |= Kφ for some s 1 ), then (M ′ , (s 2 , O)) |= ϕ, for some s 2 . Here are the interesting cases of the induction. If ϕ is a ground term t, then (M 1 , s 1 ) |= p t , and π 1 (s 1 )(p t ) = true; this means that π 2 (s 2 )(p t ) = true (by construction of M 2 ), so that π ′ ((s 2 , O))(t) = true, and (M ′ , (s 2 , O)) |= t. If ϕ is Xψ, then by the fact that (M, s) |= Xψ, and that s = (e, O), we have {ob(p) | p ∈ O} ⊢ D ψ T , and thus, (M ′ , (s 2 , O)) |= Xψ, since the same observations are used at s 2 . Similarly, if ϕ is Ob(t), then (M, s) |= Ob(t), and if s = (e, O), then t ∈ O, and thus (M ′ , (s 2 , O)) |= Ob(t), since the same observations are used at s 2 . Finally, if ϕ is Kψ, then consider an arbitrary s ′ such that (s ′ , O) ∼ (s 2 , O); since all states have the same observations, s ′ can be arbitrary in S 2 . Since K 2 was the universal relation on S 2 , we have s ′ ∈ K 2 (s 2 ). By assumption, we know (M 1 , s 1 ) |= K Kψ, and thus (M 2 , w 2 ) |= K Kψ, so that (M 2 , s ′ ) |= Kψ . By the induction hypothesis, (M ′ , (s ′ , O)) |= ψ, and since s ′ was arbitrary, (M ′ , (s 2 , O)) |= Kψ, as required.
Proof. The lower bound is given by Theorem 5.2. For the upper bound, we can do something similar to what we did in Theorem 5.1, except we need to keep track of the size of the objects we manipulate. Let ϕ be a formula of L KD (Σ). We exhibit an algorithm that nondeterministically decides if ϕ is satisfiable. From Lemma B.4, it suffices to nondeterministically guess a satisfying structure M with a set of worlds polynomial in |ϕ|, which is guaranteed to exist if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. Moreover, for every subformula Xψ of ϕ (of which there are polynomially many) and every state s of M (of which there are polynomially many), we nondeterministically guess whether the observations at s (of which there are polynomially many) can derive ψ T . We can verify that ϕ is satisfied in M in time polynomial in |ϕ|, by adapting the polynomial time algorithm of [Halpern and Moses 1992, Proposition 3.1] . Roughly speaking, the algorithm consists of enumerating all the subformulas of ϕ, and for each subformula ψ (in order of length), marking every state of M with either ψ or ¬ψ depending on whether ψ or ¬ψ holds at the state: primitive propositions are handled by invoking the interpretation, formulas of the form Xψ ′ are handled by verifying if the guess of whether ψ ′T is derivable from the observations at the state is correct, formulas of the form Ob(p) are handled by looking up p in the observations at the state (the number of which is polynomial in |ϕ|), conjunctions and negations are handled in the obvious way, and formulas Kψ ′ are handled by looking up whether every reachable state from the current state is marked with ψ ′ .
C Proofs for Section 6
Theorem 6.2. The axiomatization AX n is sound and complete for L KD n (Σ) with respect to M n (Σ).
Proof. This is a generalization of the proof of Theorem 4.1. Soundness is easy to check. For completeness, we again show that if ϕ is consistent, then ϕ is satisfiable. We give the definitions here, leaving the details of the proof to the reader. Given a set V of formulas, let V /K i = {ϕ | K i ϕ ∈ V }. Let C be the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas of L KD n (Σ). For V ∈ C, let V /Ob i = {p | Ob i (p) ∈ V }. We define ≈ i over C, for every i, by taking V ≈ i U if and only if V /K i ⊆ U . We can check that ≈ i is an equivalence relation for every i, assuming the axioms K1-K5, just like in the proof of Lemma A.1. We can also check that if V ≈ i U , then V /Ob i = U/Ob i , and that for all ψ, if V ≈ i U , then X i ψ ∈ V if and only if X i ψ ∈ U .
As mentioned, this is a generalization of the proof of Theorem 4.1, in that the satisfying model is built from maximally consistent sets of formulas. However, it is not simply a direct generalization. For Theorem 4.1, it was sufficient to consider a single equivalence class of the relation ≈ as the set of states: all the states could be assumed to have the same observations, thus ∼ could be taken to be a universal relation in the canonical model. That this can be done is strongly related to Theorem B.1, which says that if a formula of L K is satisfiable at all (in an L K -structure), it is satisfiable in a structure with a universal relation. That result does not hold, however, when we consider multiple agents. This makes the argument slightly more complex.
Let ϕ be a consistent formula of L KD n (Σ), and let Sub(ϕ) be the set of subformulas of ϕ (including ϕ itself). Let O ϕ = {p | Ob i (p) ∈ Sub(ϕ), for some i}, X ϕ = {ψ | X i ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ), for some i}, and K ϕ = {ψ | K i ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ)}. Clearly, O ϕ , X ϕ , and K ϕ are finite sets. First, we claim that any consistent set of formulas F (with F/Ob i ⊆ O ϕ for all i) can be extended to a maximally consistent set F ′ (with F ′ /Ob i ⊆ O ϕ for all i): construct the set F ′′ incrementally starting with F , adding Ob(p) for every observation p ∈ O ϕ if Ob(p) is consistent with the current set, and adding ¬Ob(p) for every observation p either not appearing in O ϕ or inconsistent with the current set; it is easy to establish that F ′′ is consistent, so F ′′ is extensible to a maximally consistent set F ′ with F ′ /Ob i ⊆ O ϕ for all i. Let C(ϕ) be the set of all maximally consistent sets of formulas F with F/Ob i ⊆ O ϕ for all i. We shall use C(ϕ) as our states. The fact that we consider C(ϕ) means, roughly, that we consider only observations in O ϕ as relevant.
The set X ϕ is finite, so let S 1 , . . . , S 2 |X ϕ | be an enumeration of the subsets of X ϕ . Let p 1 , . . . , p 2 |X ϕ | be a set of primitive propositions not in O ϕ , where we associate p i with S i . Define the function tag X (V ) mapping every set V ∈ C(ϕ) to the primitive proposition corresponding to the set (∪ i (V /X i )) ∩ X ϕ where V /X i = {ψ | X i ψ ∈ V }. Thus, tag X (V ) gives the primitive proposition corresponding to the formulas in X ϕ that appear under an X i in V .
In a similar way, the set K ϕ is finite, so let T 1 , . . . , T 2 |K ϕ | be an enumeration of the subsets of K ϕ . Let q 1 , . . . , q 2 |X ϕ | be a set of primitive propositions not in O ϕ or {p 1 , . . . , p 2 |X ϕ | }, where we associate q i with T i . Define the function tag K (V ) mapping every set V ∈ C(ϕ) to the primitive proposition corresponding to the set (∪ i (V /K i )) ∩ K ϕ . Thus, tag K (V ) gives the primitive proposition corresponding to the formulas in K ϕ that appear under an K i in V .
Since ϕ is consistent, there is a set V ϕ ∈ C(ϕ) with ϕ ∈ V ϕ . Define the deductive algorithmic knowledge structure M ϕ = (S ϕ , π ϕ , D ϕ 1 , . . . , D ϕ n ) by taking
We can check that M ϕ is a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure with n agents. Moreover, it is easy to check that if s V ∼ i s U in M ϕ , then for all ψ ∈ X ϕ , X i ψ ∈ V if and only if X i ψ ∈ U .
(Indeed, if s V ∼ i s U , then tag X (V ) = tag X (U ), and the result follows from the choice of tags.) Clearly, we also have that if V ≈ i U , then s V ∼ i s U : we already know that V ≈ i U implies V /Ob i = U/Ob i , and V ≈ i U means that the same X i ψ formulas are in V and U , and therefore, we also have tag X (V ) = tag X (U ), and similarly the same K i ψ formulas are in V and U and tag K (V ) = tag K (U ), and thus s V ∼ i s U . Moreover, we have that if s U ∼ i s V , then the same K i ϕ are formulas are in U and V , since tag K (U ) = tag K (V ).
We can prove, adapting the proof of Theorem 4.1, that for all s V ∈ S ϕ and all subformulas ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ), (M ϕ , s V ) |= ψ if and only if ψ ∈ V . Here are the interesting cases of the induction.
For Ob i (p), first assume that (M ϕ , s V ) |= Ob i (p). This means that p ∈ V /Ob i (since tag X (V ), tag K (V ) ∈ O ϕ , we cannot have p = tag X (V ) or p = tag K (V )), and thus Ob i (p) ∈ V . Conversely, if Ob i (p) ∈ V , then p ∈ V /Ob i , so that (M ϕ , s V ) |= Ob i (p). Now, consider a deductive algorithmic knowledge formula Xψ. First, assume that we have (M ϕ , s V ) |= X i ψ. By definition, {ob i (tag X (V )), ob i (tag K (V ))} ∪ {ob i (p) | p ∈ V /Ob i } ⊢ D ϕ i ψ T . If ψ is Ob i (p) for some p ∈ V /Ob i (we cannot have p = tag X (V ) or p = tag K (V ), by choice of tags), then (M ϕ , s V ) |= Ob i (p), and thus Ob i (p) ∈ V by the induction hypothesis; by X2, X i Ob i (p) ∈ V . Otherwise, consider the derivation of ψ T . By examination of D ϕ i , the last rule in this derivation must have ob i (tag X (V )) in the premise (since there is a single tag in the premise of every rule, and the tag at state V is tag X (V )). By definition of D ϕ i , this means that X i ψ ∈ V , as required. Conversely, assume that X i ψ ∈ V . By definition of D ϕ i , ({ob i (tag X (V ))} ∪ {ob i (p) | p ∈ V /Ob i }, ψ T ) ∈ D ϕ i , and thus {ob i (tag X (V ))} ∪ {ob i (p) | p ∈ V /Ob i } ⊢ D ϕ i ψ T , meaning that (M ϕ , s V ) |= X i ψ.
For a knowledge formula K i ψ, the argument is similar to that in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Completeness follows from the fact that ϕ ∈ V ϕ and ϕ ∈ Sub(ϕ), so that (M ϕ , s V ) |= ϕ, and thus ϕ is satisfiable. Theorem 6.3. The axiomatization AX n augmented with axioms AX D 1 n , . . . , AX Dn n is sound and complete for L KD n (Σ) with respect to M D 1 ,...,Dn⊆ (Σ). Proof. Soundness is again straightforward. For completeness, we prove the equivalent statement that if ϕ is consistent then ϕ is satisfiable in some structure in M D 1 ,...,Dn (Σ). The procedure is exactly the one that is used to prove Theorem 6.2, except that we construct the deductive systems D ϕ 1 , . . . , D ϕ n differently. We simply indicate where the proof differs from that of Theorem 6.2, and let the reader fill in the details. We construct, for a given ϕ, a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure with n
